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Due to the lack of Ebola outbreak early warning alert, preparedness, surveillance and response systems, the most
deadly, complex and largest ever seen Ebola war has been devastating West African communities. The unparalleled
Ebola tsunami has prompted interrogations into, and uncertainties about, the effectiveness and efficiency of
national, regional and international community’s illed- responses using conventional humanitarian control and
containment approaches and methods. The late humanitarian and local non-government organisations emergency
responses and challenges to curb transmission dynamics and stop the ongoing spread in the Ebola outbreak in
West Africa have led to an unprecedented toll of 14,413 reported Ebola cases in eight countries since the outbreak
began, with 5,177 reported deaths including 571 health-care workers and 325 died as 14 November 2014. These
indications the need of further evaluation of monitoring as substantial proportion of infections outside the context
of Ebola epicentres, Ebola health centres treatment and care, infection prevention and control quality assurance
checks in these countries. At the same time, exhaustive efforts should target ensuring an sufficient supply of
optimal personal protective equipment (PPE) to all Ebola treatment facilities, along with the provision of training
and relevant guidelines to limit to the minimum possible level of risk. The continent hosts a big proportion of the
world’s wealth, yet its people live in abject poverty, with governments unable to feed and govern them effectively,
and who are condemned to endure even darker moments with the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Institutionalisation
of practical and operational non-conventional emergency response models efficient health systems, and tailored
programmes can clearly support to prevent, control and eventually stamp out Ebola geo-distribution in addition to
population mental health services that are requisite to address the massive range of the health, socio-psychological
and economic consequences during and post Ebola associated crises. There is a critical need for a more pragmatic
and robust scientific approach to transform and re-orient the huge natural and human resource potentials towards
achieving universal coverage, the 2015–2030 Millennium Developing Goals (MDGs), sustainable growth and
development in Africa.
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Introduction
Review of tsunami scale humanitarian crisis in West Africa
The tsunami scale humanitarian crisis in West Africa
Ebola outbreak is the largest, most complex and most
severe ever seen. Compared to previous episodes in parts
of Africa, this outbreak was underestimated. Humanitar-
ian organisations have been besieged by the tenacious
wave of new cases, which far outgrows the available
basic medical, and health capacities and late emergency
responses [1]. The potential Ebola pandemic and the
negative impact thus far with conventional processes
and tools deployed being largely unsuccessful under-
score the urgent need for rapid rethinking and/or re-
engineering of innovative approaches including the use
of non-conventional intervention(NCI) methods and
actions which are prohibited by international health reg-
ulations under emergency humanitarian crisis, but could
be effective to prevent further Ebola spread, save the
lives of millions and protect the regional and world’s
economy. NCI in Ebola tragedy appears to be new and
frightening may be due to the undertone and previous
documented impact of such strategy in crisis control
and management worldwide [1,2]. However, should NCI
effective in Ebola virus outbreak and humanitarian crisis
prevention and containment in West Africa, offer a
novel 21st century approach and tools for target and
timely emergency actions, partnership and empower-
ment of the communities, strengthening of rapid case
identification and contact tracing, infrastructure devel-
opment for patients care and effective quarantine of
suspected and relatives contact with patients, patients
body fluids or deceased, proper protection of healthcare
workers, monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Such evi-
dence is yet to be established through the ongoing NCI
on Ebola widespread in West Africa, mainly in Liberia
and Sierra Leone.
There are five subtypes of the Ebola Virus Disease
(EVD), each named after its country of origin: Ebola
Zaire, Ebola Cote d’Ivoire, Ebola Sudan, Ebola Reston
and Ebola Bundibugyo. The disease is classified as a viral
haemorrhagic fever. The EVD is introduced into the hu-
man population through close direct contact with the
blood, organs or other body fluids of infected animals or
people. Those who have had direct contact with bodily
fluids of a person/patient who is infected with the Ebola
virus, who have handled a body of a person who died of
Ebola, healthcare workers working with patients infected
with the Ebola virus, and family and friends of patients
with Ebola are at a higher risk. Burial ceremonies inwhich mourners have direct contact with the body of
the deceased person can also play a role in the transmis-
sion of the virus. Healthcare workers have been infected
while treating patients with suspected or confirmed
EVD, when infection control measures are deficient. The
incubation period varies between 2–21 days and is, most
often, less after exposure. It is characterised by severe
fever, haemorrhaging (bleeding), multiple organ failure
and often death [2].
The Ebola outbreak in West Africa is considered to be
one of the world’s deadliest to date. The EVD illnesses
are increasing exponentially in Liberia, where taxis are
literal vehicles of disease transmission as they ferry sick
people between treatment centres that are too full to
admit them. At least 5,176 people have died of the virus
in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Mali, and
the virus has resulted in more than 8,000 orphans [1,2].
The situation is extremely worrisome, and health workers
themselves are becoming scared of treating patients,
which puts a further strain on the health services of the
West African states that have historically faced a shortage
of doctors, facilities and supplies, as well as poor health
infrastructure and facilities [3]. Neighbouring countries in-
cluding Ivory Coast and Senegal have shut their borders,
and airlines are suspending flights to affected countries.
More than 300 doctors and nurses have died in the Ebola
epidemic in West Africa due to a lack of, and/or, chal-
lenges and limitations in implementation of appropriate
conventional outbreak control and containment measures.
Moreover, other reasons have been ascribed and contrib-
uted to the worsening the West Africa crisis such as: lack
of timely international community action, uncoordinated
humanitarian organisations, lack of emergency response
models in limited resources settings, apprehension and
resistance of local population, traditional setting culture
and attitudes to health, and health seeking behaviour and
attitudes, weak or inexistent epidemic preparedness, early
alert systems and contingency plans, regional and global
outbreak and emergency response unpreparedness, inad-
equate moral and psychological guide and counselling to,
healthcare workers, domestic and foreign staff, and popu-
lation, poor governance and corruption, inability and
failure to meet up with the endorsed Abuja declaration in
investing 15% of their national Gross Domestic Products
(GDP) into Health since 2000, lack of accountability and
transparency in most systems, dearth local resource staff
shortages in addition to rural community health center
and other personal protective equipment [3,4]. Also, there
are poor or no early warning alert and surveillance sys-
tems and evidence-based responses [5]. To compound
matters, sending supplies and additional medical staff to
help the affected communities has become more difficult
due to flight cancellations and border closures which is
aimed at averting the increasing spread of the Ebola
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by curbing the ongoing transmission dynamics [1,6]. The
World Health Organisation’s (WHO’s) assessment, based
on reports from an emergency team in Liberia, said that
‘non-conventional interventions’ are needed to control the
outbreak as the demands have outstripped the govern-
ment’s and partners’ capacity to respond effectively. The
situation requires further support and mobilisation of in-
novative approach such as non-conventional intervention
assets to stem out the persistent Ebola outbreak’s geo-
distribution and dynamic spread across West Africa [7].
The Ebola outbreak humanitarian crisis is characterised
by a series of events which represent a critical threat to
the health, safety, security and wellbeing of the local, na-
tional and international community. This crisis may evolve
and/or extend beyond the mandate or capacity of any sin-
gle agency. Such humanitarian crises can be grouped
under the following headings: (1) natural disasters
(earthquakes, floods, storms and volcanic eruptions);
(2) man-made disasters (conflicts, plane and train
crashes, fires and industrial accidents); and (3) com-
plex emergencies (when the effects of a series of
events or factors prevent a community from accessing
their basic needs, such as water, food, shelter, security
or health care) [1,3,8]. Hence, complex emergencies
are typically characterised by extensive violence and
loss of lives (case fatality); displacement of populations;
widespread damage to societies and economies; the need
for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance; and
the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by
political and military constraints and significant security
risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas. Al-
though individuals can be diagnosed definitively in a labora-
tory through blood tests, collecting samples from patients
is an extreme biohazard risk with testing conducted under
maximum biological containment conditions [7]. Severely
ill patients require intensive supportive care and intraven-
ous fluids. In the ongoing Ebola outbreak, the increasing
geographical distribution in the region and the rising
fatality rate is due to a lack of specific treatment or vac-
cine, although new drug therapies are being evaluated.
Implementing the new WHO roadmap synchronised
coordination with 3–4 times scaling up for impactful
international responses will help the affected countries
stop the ongoing transmission. This requires several
detailed conventional and non-conventional global re-
sponses, estimated to cost at least US $600 million. The
military humanitarian involvement announcements for
the two countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) follow a
strongly-worded statement issued on September 2nd,
2014 by Doctors Without Borders (MSF), which states
that world leaders are failing to address the worst-ever
Ebola epidemic. It called on states with biological disaster-
response capacity both civilian and military to send assetsand personnel to West Africa. In a speech to the United
Nations, the MSF International President stated that the
Ebola epidemic has overstretched the response capacities
of West Africa’s health ministries and non-government
organisations (NGOs). In the past, MSF has discouraged
military interventions in national health emergencies but
the ongoing Ebola epidemic transmission has reached
levels that can’t be contained without a massive deploy-
ment of specialised medical units to boost control efforts
[1,7]. The Ebola tsunami is creating a dire need for more
health workers in Liberia, who unfortunately are often un-
knowingly exposed to patients with a virus with symptoms
that mimic other diseases such as malaria, or while work-
ing in wards that aren’t designed for EVD treatment. The
WHO reported that 152 of Liberia’s health workers have
been infected with the disease. A total of 571 health-care
workers (HCWs) are known to have been infected with
EVD: 93 in Guinea; 332 in Liberia; 2 in Mali; 11 in Nigeria;
128 in Sierra Leone; 1 in Spain; and 4 in the United States
of America (2 were infected in the USA, 1 each in Guinea
and Sierra Leone). A total of 325 HCWs have died. With
the doctor-to-patient ratio already stretched dangerously
thin, every infection or death of a doctor or nurse depletes
response capacity significantly Following the WHO Ebola
Response Roadmap structure, country reports fall into two
categories: 1) those with widespread and intense transmis-
sion (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone); and 2) those with
or that have had an initial case or cases, or with localized
transmission (Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, and the United
States of America). An overview of a separate, unrelated
outbreak of EVD in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
is also provided. In Mali, there have been so far 4 reported
cases, including 4 reported deaths. Whereas, the outbreaks
of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Senegal and Nigeria were
declared over on 17 October and 19 October 2014, respect-
ively. A national EVD outbreak is considered to be over
when 42 days (double the 21-day incubation period of the
Ebola [2].
The use of the prime-boost strategy based on the Zaire
and Sudan strains attenuated a strain glycoprotein that
was first tested on animals for eight weeks. The two-
vaccine regimens were effective, though a single dose of
the first vaccine provided complete short-term and par-
tial long-term protection. The two-dose regimen pro-
tected the chimpanzee adenovirus rather than a human
for a full 10 months; earlier tests challenged the ma-
caques only four and five weeks after vaccination, ac-
cording to the report [7].
The value of non-conventional interventions
against Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa
1. Compassionate use of an experimental drug (serum)
in humanitarian crisis
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serum? The news seemed astounding to the scientific
community and the affected communities in Africa. It
was reported that the two Americans being treated at
Emory seemed to have been revived and possibly sur-
vived the Ebola infection. In the absence of a drug or
vaccine to treat Ebola, the ZMapp experimental serum
has been endorsed by the WHO to be deployed on com-
passionate grounds or benevolence action [7,9].
In certain situations, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) allows companies to provide their experimental
drugs to people outside of clinical trials, and such use is
referred to as compassionate use. But getting access to not
yet approved drugs through a compassionate use request
can be a long and challenging process. In emergency situa-
tions such as an outbreak, access to investigational or ex-
perimental drugs for prevention or treatment may be
reviewed following an FDA request application and time-
line prediction of potential alternative intervention(s). The
request must meet some definite criteria, which can in-
clude that the company has to comply with the request
for an experimental drug or confirm whether the disease
is life threatening. Other criteria can include determining
if there is availability of any other treatment and if the pa-
tient has not been helped by approved treatments. A phys-
ician and/or pharmacologist-epidemiologist outbreak
expert should also attest with evidence that that the option
or benefit of such an experimental drug may pose danger-
ous unknown risks or be ineffective), on any early preclin-
ical or early clinical study results about the drug trials with
documented reports guidance from pharmaceutical indus-
try good manufacturing processes. The Tekmira, Newlink
and BioCryst pharmaceutical companies, supported by the
US government, the National Institute of Allergy and In-
fectious Diseases (NIAID), the Department of Defence’s
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the HHS’ Biomed-
ical Advanced Research and Development Authority
(BARDA), are working to develop therapeutic candidates
for the EVD but are still at the early testing phase (con-
ducting animal studies on safety and toxicity). Hence, it is
impossible to discuss or negotiate on the compassionate
use of an experimental drug programme for the West Af-
rican outbreak due to the established scientific clinical tri-
als guidelines and FDA regulations. The need to
understand and consult all stakeholders such as human
device regulations holders, institutional review boards
(IRBs), clinical investigators and FDA staff on humanitar-
ian device exemption (HDE) is highly recommended as
new cases are increasing exponentially.
Medical, ethical and legal considerations of ZMapp
experimental serum deployment
In the absence any Ebola drug and/or vaccine, the ex-
perimental vaccine was approved by a committee ofexperts based on compassionate grounds that it might
provide protection against the Ebola menace. The WHO
announced the endorsement of the implementation of
the compassionate use of ZMAPP in providing relief to
Ebola patients. The affected populations in West Africa
have received the consent of the WHO/AFRO regional,
African affected government and international humanitar-
ian organisations in frontline responses and interventions
[9,10]. Over the past nine months, the WHO/AFRO and
affected West African governments and stakeholders, in-
cluding some humanitarian organisations, have consented
on the compassionate use and deployment of experimen-
tal ZMapp serum, however, it is not certain what the posi-
tions are and what reserve of populations is in crisis.
Currently, these drugs/vaccines or therapies have shown
to be efficacious in animal models. Notwithstanding, the
lack of substantial pre-clinical and clinical data, as well as
pharmacovigilance information, renders these products
inadequate and doubtful to prevent or treat a human
patient/subject with the EVD, who has a different ex-
posure history, genetic make-up and environmental
factors. A number of candidate vaccines and therapies
have been developed and tested in animal models, and
some have demonstrated promising results. In view of
the urgency and severity of the outbreak, the inter-
national community is mobilising to find ways to ac-
celerate the evaluation and use of these compounds.
Safety in humans is also unknown, raising the possibil-
ity of adverse side effects when administered [7]. The
use of these products is demanding and requires intra-
venous administration and infrastructure, such as cold
chain and facilities able to offer good and safe stan-
dards of care.
A two-day discussion was held, centring on the poten-
tial safety and efficacy evidence associated with the use
of Ebola therapies and vaccines in chronic case human
subjects, with more than 150 participants representing
the fields of research and clinical investigation. Ethics,
legal and regulatory concerns, combined with unusual
factors, including impoverished infrastructure and health
facilities, make it imperative and mandatory to provide
all evidence to gather the required scientific, pharmaco-
logical and toxicological data on any testing of un-
approved experimental products. Detailed and accurate
population time-point events, and administered product
kinetics and dynamics with interactive clinical data col-
lection in such an impractical field have to be mindful of
the short- and long-term effects on the most vulnerable
populations. This data is vital and informative to evalu-
ate the potential risks and benefits that can help identify
the most potential promising product amidst several
therapeutic and vaccine interventions. This should be
the focus of in-depth clinical evaluation over space and
time [7,11].
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cult to answer such as: Can ZMapp obtain individual or
community informed consent (‘Yes, I understand, and
I’m still willing to participate’) despite the unknown
short- and long-term implications of such an experimen-
tal drug? Can someone who is gravely ill and who has
never heard of the concept of ‘informed consent’ truly
consider the implications of taking a drug like ZMapp?
What are the risks of participation and non-participation
of domestic and international vulnerable populations?
How do we ensure that people know they are participat-
ing in trials? Could individuals feel coerced because
foreign doctors are the ones asking for consent? Does
the patient understand that the drug might not work, or
might have very negative side effects down the track?
When should physicians use science and experience evi-
dence to guide their actions on human study? Also com-
pounding these dilemmas is the fact that ZMapp has
never before been tested on humans.
There are no simple answers to these questions of
safety concerns, and the dilemmas faced by scientists
and public health workers with respect to using ZMapp
are complex. Ethical criteria must guide the provision of
such interventions, including transparency about all
aspects of care, informed consent, freedom of choice,
confidentiality, respect for the person, community preser-
vation of dignity and involvement. The need to prioritize
appropriate promising evidence care, fairness on the risks
and benefits of using experimental treatments, and timely
information dissemination to the community during and
post trails as ascribed in Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) regulations as well as compassionate recovery/
rehabilitation public-health programmes and mea-
sures. Except for the Ebola crisis and death toll, any
scientific, ethical and justifiable moral reasoning re-
mains unclear. Hence, transparency about all aspects
of prevention and care including pharmacovigilance of
any affected community in Africa and elsewhere is im-
perative. The ultimate goal will be doing robust sci-
ence and research for by minimizing detrimental side
effects and better understand how we might tackle the
epidemic containment and eradication for the com-
mon good of humanity caring services, scientific ra-
tionale and effectiveness of potent vaccines and drugs,
and least infringement; public justification for social
justice and for global prosperity.
Lessons learnt from unethical and illegal tragedies
resulting from research travesties include the following:
Pfizer’s disastrous trovafloxacin clinical trial during the
1996 meningococcal meningitis outbreak in impoverished
settings in Nigeria [12]; the US Public Health Service (PHS)
study of untreated syphilis in black Americans (male
negro), better known as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study
(1932–1972); the US PHS Inoculation Sexually TransmittedDiseases (STD) studies in Guatemala (1946–1948); and the
thalidomide tragedy of birth defect epidemics (1950s–
1960s) against the Nuffield Council of Bioethics and
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well the
Helsinki Declarations [13,14]. Understanding the cul-
tural context of risks and benefits, evaluation of the
consent and potential presence of undue influence or
coercion and cultural sensitivity in the review proced-
ure, the equitability of local enrolment, comprehensive
databases of the local population on the actual epi-
demiology of outbreaks, privacy and confidentiality
concerns, and evaluating the long-term welfare of hu-
man participants after ZMapp research are imperious
and mandatory in line with clinical trial basic require-
ments and regulations.
It is also worth mentioning that the joint WHO/
AFRO, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and stakeholder expert committees en-
dorsed the following consensus:
(1) The use of whole blood therapies and convalescent
blood serums needs to be considered as a matter of
priority;
(2) Safety studies of the two most advanced vaccines
identified based on the vesicular stomatitis
virus (VSV-EBO) and chimpanzee adenovirus
(ChAd-EBO) are being initiated in the US, and will
be started in Africa and Europe in mid-September
2014. The WHO will work with all the relevant
stakeholders to accelerate their development
and safe use in affected countries. If proven safe,
a vaccine could be available in November 2014 for
priority use in healthcare workers;
(3) In addition to blood therapies and candidate
vaccines, the participants discussed the availability
and evidence supporting the use of novel
therapeutic drugs, including monoclonal antibodies,
RNA-based drugs and small antiviral molecules.
They also considered the potential use of existing
drugs approved for other diseases and conditions.
Of the novel products discussed, some have shown
great promise in monkey models and have been
used in a few Ebola patients (although, in too few
cases to permit any conclusion about efficacy);
(4) Existing supplies of all experimental medicines are
limited. While efforts are underway to accelerate
production, supplies will not be sufficient for
several months to come. The prospects of having
augmented supplies of vaccines rapidly look
slightly better;
(5) The ‘participants’ cautioned that investigation of
these interventions should not detract attention
from the implementation of effective clinical care,
rigorous infection prevention and control, careful
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communication and social mobilisation, all of which
are crucial for ending these outbreaks; and
(6) The recipients of experimental interventions,
locations of studies and study design should be
based on the aim of learning as much as we can as
fast as we can without compromising patient care
or health worker safety, with active participation of
local scientists and proper consultation with
communities [7].
However, based on the Internal Health Regulations
(2005) and the Human Rights Declarations, the use of
human subjects in humanitarian crisis situations re-
quires adherence to crucial elements in regards to M&E
and all aspects of vaccine/drug pharmacovigilance: (i)
appropriate protocols must be rapidly developed for in-
formed consent and safe use; (ii) effective and reliable
mechanism for evaluating pre-clinical data should be
put in place in order to recommend which interventions
should be evaluated as a first priority; (iii) a timely plat-
form must be established for transparent, real-time
collection and sharing of data, finally detailed, (iv) con-
sistent regular short- and long-term safety monitoring
boards need to be established for these vulnerable
populations; and (vi) continuous evaluation of medical,
clinical and health data from all interventions with sys-
tematic, transparent, liable and responsible short- and
long-term exposed population health record assess-
ments, information and community updates, as well as
appropriate compensation and rehabilitation programmes,
if any.
2. Humanitarian military intervention in the Ebola
outbreak emergency response
The most important question concerning this inter-
vention is: can around 3,000 US and UK military forces
coupled with local military/policy do and accomplish the
tasks at hand, or can they help with relief logistics and
implement the much-needed public health programmes?
In the meantime, the demands of alternative responses
to the Ebola outbreak have completely outstripped the
government’s and relevant partners’ capacity to respond.
Fourteen of Liberia’s 15 counties have now reported con-
firmed cases [2]. The international community has a re-
sponsibility to mount a humanitarian intervention by
outside forces, and authorise member states to take all
necessary measures and change strategy in humanitarian
interventions backed by regional or global combined
bodies to protect vulnerable populations in West Africa.
These relief measures include quiet diplomacy, con-
structive engagement, provision of relief materials, ad-
equate sheltering and food aid for the hard-to-reachcommunities using military aircrafts, and confidence
building for the more confrontational means of adhering
to outbreak emergence guidelines to stop the transmis-
sion. In addition to community and national conven-
tional intervention approaches and programmes, the
military could be used to reinforce the rule of law in
contact tracing or in changing burial cultural practices,
and to limit community resistance and hostility against
health staff. In a humanitarian military intervention, the
violation of nation’s/state’s sovereignty for the purpose
of protecting human life should be cautionary. It is im-
portant to avoid humanitarian organisations, govern-
ment/ethnic group preventable repression, famine, civil
breakdown and preventable death, as well as guarantee
success with varying degrees of seriousness depending
on the severity and impact of the Ebola humanitarian
crisis coordinated use of mixed conventional and non-
conventional emergency responses [15-17].
The concept of national sovereignty has long been the
chief legal and political obstacle to military intervention
in pursuit of humanitarian objectives, linking respect for
human rights with world peace, thereby allowing for the
preservation of the principle of sovereignty and non-
interference. This principle of sovereignty was estab-
lished in modern times with the Treaty of Westphalia
(1648 exercised by governments on behalf of the people,
more or less democratically. Sovereignty thus became
the cornerstone of human rights legislation, which
brought an end to the Thirty Years’ War and a century
of destructive religious conflict in Europe. The benefit of
the principle of sovereignty, and its corollary of non-
interference in the affairs of another state, was the end to
confessional conflicts/wars [15,17]. The negative result
was the growth of absolutist government where sover-
eignty was located in the person rather than the ruler.
African and Asian nations (not nation-states) were invaded
and conquered, sometimes in the name of civilisation and
humanitarianism. In contrast to the contemporary debates
around intervention in Bosnia and even Iraq reflect the
same sort of hesitation to intervene when the main issue is
a regime’s treatment of its own subjects [18].
For these reasons, consideration of a military humani-
tarian intervention should be subject to rigorous precon-
ditions, which have rarely, if ever, been met in practice.
Military intervention, if acceptable at all, should be a last
resort. Where military intervention is contemplated or
implemented, there has always been a history of inept or
damaging diplomacy and peacekeeping, and inadequate
or incompetent relief programmes by the international
community. Alternatives, if tried, rarely have been tried
properly. In every case in which military intervention
has been tried or is contemplated, observers with de-
tailed knowledge of the situation can point to missed op-
portunities and serious blunders [15,17].
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intervention
The Ebola outbreak has been spreading like wildfire
devouring everything in its path across West Africa. Cus-
tomary international law has always recognised a principle
of military intervention on humanitarian grounds. The
classic examples of 19th-century ‘military humanitarian
intervention’ history allow us to take a more sceptical view
with regard to the interests at stake. Nonetheless, the the-
oretical and legal debate has been sophisticated. In the
case of the Ebola outbreak, non-intervention – as in
the case of a revolution which may sometimes snatch a
remedy beyond the reach of law, its essence is legality
and its justification – should be at the helm of its
success in curbing the Ebola crisis, strengthening the
delivery of health care to the far-to-reach and most
vulnerable communities, restore hopes and foster sus-
tainable development [19].
For example, European confidence in its ‘civilising mis-
sion’ was severely tested by the experience of dictator-
ship, beginning with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in
1935. The UN Charter was therefore drawn up in the
context of extreme scepticism about ‘humanitarian’ justi-
fications for intervention purposes [18]. Critics of mili-
tary humanitarian intervention argue that it is no
accident that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
in customary law was so abused that it had become
worthless. Advocates argue that the UN Charter is de-
signed to restrict the use of force to self-defence and col-
lective action in support of peace and human rights.
Over the last 40 years, a number of governments have
justified unilateral military action with reference to the
customary law of military humanitarian intervention in
one form or another. Without exception, the international
community has refused to recognise these actions as legit-
imate. Clear instances are Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia
and Tanzania’s invasions of Uganda, both in 1979. In all
these cases, the absence of UN sanction of the military ac-
tion has been of paramount importance in the wider re-
fusal to condone the actions as true cases of humanitarian
intervention [18].
In a globalised world, military humanitarian intervention
might have recently undergone a revival in circumstances
where national sovereignty has manifestly failed to serve
the citizens of a given state. If an abusive government such
as the one in Iraq or Sudan cites ‘sovereignty’ to defend ac-
tions involving mass violations of human rights (or, in ex-
tremis, genocide), then it is clearly failing to exercise that
power on behalf of the people to whom it is supposed to
be accountable. Democratic endorsement can only be seen
as the outcome of a genuine international collective
will of the community of nations’ consensus on Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and IHR (2005), where the
benefits outweigh the consequences. This should not bethe outcome of manipulation by one or more powerful
countries with foreign policy concerns.
The legal status of military humanitarian intervention,
although challenging, may be justifiable in the Ebola cri-
sis and the joint WHO-ECOWAS community is united
in demanding such action. The problem is that few, if
any, cases of military intervention that cite this doctrine
come close to the ideal [3,8,15,17]. In fact, application of
humanitarian military intervention in practice in the
Ebola crisis in West Africa can take a variety of forms:
material assistance (through relief aid); sanctions (coer-
cive, non-military pressure to end abusive practices); and
the dispatch of military forces to remedy a human tragedy.
Response in the form of material preventive or protection
relief is difficult and has seldom proven capable to stop
the Ebola outbreak based on ongoing unnoticed and coun-
terproductive efforts of relief organisations with resulting
long-term health and economic consequences. Situations
of assistance are even more problematic since they are
likely to have strategic military significance [3,17,20]. For
example, the large-scale provision of aid to Ethiopia in the
mid-1980s helped to make possible counterinsurgency
campaigns that were deeply damaging to the rural poor.
In a nutshell, material relief or diplomatic interventions
with humanitarian goals not to mention coercive steps
such as sanctions – are loaded with strategic significance,
may be difficult to implement and are rarely done particu-
larly well due to incompetence or mixed motives by the
UN or other representatives of the international commu-
nity. This is an essential point to grasp before considering
the merits and demerits of military intervention in pursuit
of genuine and holistic humanitarian aims and responses
in Africa.
3. Promoting the use of non-conventional sheltering
for Ebola victims and survivors
During the ongoing Ebola outbreak, though house-
holds and buildings have been inspected and determined
to be safe, several vulnerable populations fled their
homes to take refuge in urban cities across borders and
elsewhere, with the hope that governments and the
international community would provide more befitting
security, as well as daily basic medical services for their
survival. This requires donations; health worker volun-
teers; logistical support/anchorage management; public
health, medical and mental health services; food services
for families; survivors’ reunification to local culture, cus-
toms and security of lives and properties [20,21]. Also
there’s need for contingency and emergency evacuation
planning and recovery programmes.
Emergency responses, management agencies and juris-
dictions are recognising the need to plan for sheltering
operations as a result of their historical use following
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gregate shelters is exceeded. Some examples are the
Northridge Earthquake (1994), Hurricane Katrina (2005)
and the Samoa Tsunami (2009), just to name a few.
Open space shelters or other shelter options need to be
appropriate for the local environment and weather con-
ditions (not all tents are designed for all weather condi-
tions) [20].
To capture pertinent information regarding the histor-
ical use of non-conventional sheltering, we focused on
two sheltering models: (1) mega-shelters, which are large
facilities (e.g. stadiums or conference centres) that can
house large groups of evacuees, and (2) open space shel-
ters, which are large outdoor environments (e.g. funfair
grounds or parks) and use soft-sided or temporarily con-
structed structures. These require high levels of coordin-
ation and organisation between the public and private
sector. Spontaneous open space shelters have been initi-
ated for the Ebola-affected population, and other open
space shelters have been initiated by governments, NGOs
and humanitarian organisations (schools, hospitals/clinics,
stadium, recreation centres and parks).
4. Scaling up nutrition and utilisation of non-
conventional food aid resources
Although a number of nutritious food resources are
both cultivated and gathered in the different ecological
zones of Africa, Ebola treatment centres, food security,
balanced nutritious diets, hunger and malnutrition remain
major challenges across the continent [22]. Reasons why
the food and agricultural sector performs poorly in the dif-
ferent geographical parts of Africa are external, internal
and natural. With the growing capacity of West African
countries to import food to supplement inadequate do-
mestic production and consumption supplies, keeping
these food resources for times of crises/disasters should
have been kept a priority [8]. Non-conventional food aid
resources should be provided for and delivered to vulner-
able populations in the respective communities and
countries, and timely national agricultural and livestock
empowerment response programmes, raising awareness
and providing the civilian population with constant in-
formation, training and capacity building, and guid-
ance and support, and information management as
well as grooming entrepreneurship culture. Motivat-
ing, educating, stimulating and persuading the public
to employ lifesaving measures or mechanisms that trig-
ger the effectiveness and efficiency of the cultural
behaviour and daily life practices and in emergency sit-
uations should also be encouraged [23,24].
The presence of Western relief agencies can give
spurious humanitarian credentials to military operations
designed to displace and impoverish rural communities.The relief programmes in humanitarian crisis that have
been successful have been implemented in concert with
attempts to address the strategic context as well and
capitalize on local health workers towards optimal
mobilization and participation in community interven-
tions. For example, in 1989, Operation Lifeline played
a key role in restoring a degree of normality to south-
ern Sudan, devastated by war and famine [23]. There
was a simultaneous ceasefire brought about by in-
ternal political processes in Sudan. The ceasefire made
it possible for rural people to return home, plant crops
and herd their animals in confidence that they would
not be attacked. Trade and labour migration also be-
came possible. The economic benefit of these activities
was far greater than the provision of relief, though the
latter received much more international publicity on
future outbreak global response responsibilities and
actions [25].
How can the strategic context of the famine and malnu-
trition caused by the Ebola outbreak best be addressed?
UN or World Bank resolutions and other diplomatic and
economic measures? Unfortunately, such are not given
the chance to work, are broken or are only attempted too
late. In addition, many conventional interventions ac-
tually contribute to varied degrees of human suffering
and hardship especially regarding vulnerable popula-
tions in developing countries. Thoroughly constructive
and participatory diplomacy achieved by associating
and guiding local civic groups, notably the churches,
and local NGOs to promote alternative support initia-
tives is equally vital and proving to be productive. The
deployment of UN peacekeeping forces can usually be
classified as a diplomatic, rather than a military, interven-
tion. Peacekeepers are deployed with the consent of the
combatant parties as part of a diplomatic process.
5. Management of non-conventional humanitarian
interventions
Management should involve system enhancement and
implemented through joint efforts guided by evidence-
based information both from community and frontline
humanitarian organisations. Timely and fit-for-purpose
responses should be instituted in promoting trust, co-
operation and prompt recovery through accessible and
24 hour-functioning Ebola healthcare centres and deliv-
ery of other public healthcare services nationwide. The
need to encourage sustainable mobile health or web-
based health application surveillance and early warning
alert systems towards rapid information and communi-
cation management and tracing is also important. Public
and private sector partnerships in emergency management
and recovery services of non-conventional interventions
require further careful research in filling knowledge gaps
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role any non-profit organisations take in disaster relief;
for-profit contractors or organisations/country may not be
as obvious but often play just as important a role. How-
ever, with the outlay of government support also comes a
variety of opinions (e.g. political agenda) which dictate
where and how the resources should be spent. Innovative
partnerships should be effective, aimed at improving and
alleviating burden, and preventing death from the out-
break in the field by utilising new methods and state-
of-the-art approaches of active mitigation, collection
responsibility in preparation, response and recovery
under the provincial, national and regional emergency
response framework.
In light of the potential success of the formal and/or
informal systems based on trust, confidence and credibil-
ity, accountability and distribution systems that enable ac-
cess to the affected communities to determine what is
required and how to proceed – and potentially combining
oversight and responsibility with more decision-making
power on the ground and increased flexibility – should be
developed. The level of creativity allows member organisa-
tions to address needs that could not be met through trad-
itional government channels, perfectly illustrating how the
work of NGOs and the governments they are associated
with should move forward hand in hand. Of course, for all
the positives that come with a more active public, there
are some difficulties associated with an increased level of
local and private-sector involvement. Inherently con-
nected to a dispersion of authority comes a lack of stand-
ardisation in the quality of work, and differing views on
the appropriateness or effectiveness of any given practice.
However, a rapidly developing and stretched emergency
can also bring these humanitarian service providers fatigue
to the point of breakdown.
As evidence of the growing philosophy of ECOWAS’
cooperation, volunteer organisations in emergency re-
sponse and management are generous with their time,
money and community outreach programmes, and co-
ordinate planning efforts that can impact significantly on
communities. Active and open relationships between
governments and non-profits or businesses with clear
guidelines for emergency chain procurement are crucial:
without regular testing and practice, all the arrange-
ments and memoranda of understanding are worthless.
Excessive rigidity in a system designed to deal with the
chaos of an emergency is a recipe for failure as trying to
prevent past mistakes brings about many questions
about how future pandemics will actually be prevented
[1,7]. The key in moving forward and continuously im-
proving our abilities is to push for a greater sense of co-
operation and synchronised coordination between the
public and private sectors, including sharing of expertise
and resources in globalisation. There are many parts ofthe field that need work and with limited resources, it
can often be difficult to accomplish everything with in-
novative solutions and leadership in order to overcome
the challenges currently faced and improving our technical
and structural processes. One of the crucial adjustments
must be an honest assessment and comprehensive ap-
proach of current funding arrangements, especially in light
of the fact that important programmes are not always the
ones that get flashy media attention, as well as impact
funding opportunities that encourage communities to take
control of their own preparedness. For example, people
prefer to have a say in what happens to them, and the co-
ordination of efforts between the government and the
public offers a sense of control over situations that can be
exceedingly chaotic. All in all, there are currently glimpses
of how safe and secure we can make our country and the
entire regional sustainable development.
There is an urgent need for concrete measures to reduce
the vulnerability of societies to deal with outbreaks, the
loss of human lives, and the heavy physical and economic
damage that occurs as a result. The development and im-
plementation of joint administrative, technological and
scientific approaches, funding mechanisms and policies
should be initiated and endorsed by African local institu-
tions and countries including intergovernmental, regional
organisations and associations that have adopted, action
programmes with the participation of private companies
and individuals (including allocation of budgetary re-
sources and the exchange of data and technology, as well
as. Importantly, the WHO roadmap guidelines on crisis/
disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation, and its
plan of action against the Ebola outbreak could guide pri-
orities commitment and work plan timeline. The develop-
ment of country initiatives to preparedness and disease
surveillance response promotion, enhanced exchange and
stronger regional cohesion, M & E translation into
concrete activities and actions in close cooperation
with all stakeholders comprising the affected commu-
nities, governments and international framework of
actions. Nurturing timely mobilisation of domestic re-
sources for sustained financial and structural stability
and establishment of functioning early warning and
surveillance response systems is invaluable evidence of
effective and concrete programmes and activities im-
plemented based on local context and in strengthening
existing health system. Similarly, commitment and
funding to study conventional and non-conventional
measures and effective programme priorities and guid-
ance, both at the national level and with respect to
sub-regional, regional and international technical co-
operation, are essential [3,7].
Conclusively, for successful outbreak reduction and
containment programmes, necessary support should be
provided to national and regional policy and to global
Tambo Infectious Diseases of Poverty 2014, 3:42 Page 10 of 11
http://www.idpjournal.com/content/3/1/42strategy development, public awareness building and re-
source mobilisation should be fostered networking.
The scientific community should be encouraged and
national committees should be supported to integrate
transdisciplinary and cross-sectorial programmes at all
levels. Effective and efficient, accurate and timely out-
breaks early warning capacities, prevention, preparedness
measures and strategic dissemination of information capi-
talising on advances in telecommunications such as social
media, internet and broadcast services are key factors to
successful crisis/disaster prevention. The need to mitigate
on improvements in coordinating platforms and its plan
of action, and capacity building in community/national
programmes and activities, is crucial in promoting reliable
and robust emergency relief systems and monitoring
adverse impacts with contingency plans for sustainable
development.
An uncertain future
Beyond operational and political concerns, humanitarian
military intervention also involves legal issues outside of
the UN Security Council mandate. In non-conventional
interventions, accountability and human rights must be
respected and could be part of an innovative model for
emergency response to global disease outbreaks based
on lessons learnt from peace and conflict resolutions
from previous military intervention outrages in conflict
events worldwide. The willingness to use non-conventional
interventions is inevitably influenced not only by the des-
peration of the affected population and cancellations of
commercial flights in West Africa, but also by economic
and geopolitical factors, including the relevance of the
country to the world community and its regional stability.
The attitudes of other major global health players have
prompted discussions on the impact of commitment and
prompt actions on Ebola outbreak humanitarian crisis in
West Africa and the urgency for African countries to em-
bark on proactive planning and steps in emerging disease
pandemic preparedness, early warning indications, surveil-
lance and emergency response. As both top-down protec-
tion and bottom-up empowerment systems should be
comprehensive, multi-dimensional, necessary to realise hu-
man security and protection from disease outbreak and
limit crises, monitoring goals and indicators should not be
limited to prevention and protection measures, but should
also include perspectives for risk reduction management,
early warning and strengthening of resilience. Strengthen-
ing of socioeconomic and environmental capital is an im-
portant component for community capacity building and
empowerment towards entrepreneurship and community
ownership of health programmes and interventions, as well
as service delivery, thus contributing directly to identifying
and implementing solutions, and individual and societal
capabilities to measure and monitor their performance.How can predictions mimic naturally both animal and hu-
man occurring disease outbreaks, lives and economic up-
heaval from future mystery illnesses with quantified
contemporary uncertainty, understanding of force-of-
infection and duration threatening to increase in the near
future?
Conclusion
Solving global health problems are increasingly becoming
too complicated to be addressed by single actors, multi-
sector actors and approaches rather than “one humanitar-
ian model fits all”, comprehensive population’s centered
and context-specific approaches. Global community and
human security, which all highlight concerns with various
threats and perils such as wars, violent conflicts, natural
disasters, catastrophic accidents and illness, should be
given close attention to enhance its preparedness and
emergency response platforms. It is unrealistic and ineffi-
cient to expect each country to be prepared for potential
threats: strategic international partnership is required to
collaboratively share the risks and strengthen societal re-
silience towards sudden outbreaks/shocks. Regional co-
operation and global cooperation have to be developed to
enhance preparedness to deal with large-scale hazards and
mitigate sustainability, protection and empowerment, and
recovery and rehabilitation programmes based on the best
and most robust scientific information and coordinated
public programmes in urban and rural areas.
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